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A Look at Questionable or Illegal Payments
By American Corporations to Foreign
Government Officials*
N EWSPAPER REPORTS are replete with accounts of
bribery, payoffs and "commissions" by American multi-
national corporations to foreign government officials and citizens.
The revelations to date indicate that as many as 70 multinational
corporations have paid 100's of millions of dollarsi to government
officials at various levels and private citizens of foreign nations
in order to promote their goods and to influence the awarding of
government contracts to their companies.
Much has been reported about the obvious ethical considera-
tions involved, the subsequent reorganization of corporate boards
of directors and executive offices in this country, and the re-
verberations that have been felt in the capitals of the nations
whose officials have so far been implicated, but surprisingly little
has been said about the anticompetitive nature of these bribes
or about the possible violations of the Securities and Exchange
Commissions' rules requiring disclosure. This note will explore
the antitrust implications which arise from these bribes and their
relationship to basic international law doctrines as presented in
testimony by Mr. Donald I. Baker. Mr. Baker, Assistant Attor-
ney General of the Antitrust Division, in testimony before the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the House
Committee on International Relations, described the Justice De-
partment's policy toward payments by American firms abroad to
foreign government officials. This article will expand upon Mr.
Baker's remarks and examine and contrast them with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's approach to this problem.
* This author wishes to express his appreciation to Donald I. Baker, newly
appointed Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division for his advice
and assistance in the preparation of this article and wishes to acknowledge that
this note derives its basis from Mr. Baker's testimony before the House Sub-
committee on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations on July 24, 1975, reprinted in 5 CCH Trade Regulation Re-
ports, 50, 238 at p. 55, 439 (1975).
1 A. R. Immel and H. G. Lawson, A Thin Line, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 5,
1976, at 1, col. 4. See also REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, sub-
mitted to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, May 12,
1976, which tabulates information on 89 corporations which have disclosed in-
formation publicly on or before April 26, 1976.
ILLEGAL PAYMENTS
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S ANTITRUST APPROACH
As international commerce grows, so do the incentives to
foreign governmental officials to extract payments from private
corporations as a condition to doing business and gaining access
to the markets and raw materials which their countries control.2
When bribery is used to further a conspiracy which restrains
the domestic or international trade of U.S. corporations or which
tends to monopolize such trade, then U.S. antitrust laws may
apply. The basic law which protects trade and commerce against
unlawful restraints and monopolies is the Sherman Act. 3  The
Act declares illegal both conspiracies to restrain trade and activ-
ity which has a monopolizing effect. The language of the statute
is intentionally broad and thus provides a high degree of adapta-
bility to new situations. The legislative history of the Act does
not indicate any real debate on the application of the statute to
international trade, as interstate and international commerce ap-
pear to have been considered completely intertwined in this far-
reaching legislation.4
As stated by Senator Hoar whose revision seems to have be-
come the accepted law:
The great thing that this bill does except affording a remedy, is
to extend the common law principles, which protected fair
competition in trade in old times in England, to international and
interstate commerce in the U.S.5
Thus the Sherman Act does not specifically declare illegal the
actual act of bribery, rather it focuses on the purpose and effect
of the conspiratorial behavior which restrains trade or leads to
monopolization.6
To the extent that bribery and similar techniques further
conspiratorial behavior which restrains trade or has the effect
of restraining trade, the entire pattern of anticompetitive be-
havior may be subject to prosecution. 7
As stated by Mr. Baker:
2 Donald I. Baker, Payments to Foreign Governmental Officials, 5 CCH
Trade Regulation Reports, 50, 238, at p. 55,439 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Baker).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See Claudy, Sherman Anti-Trust Law: Applicability to
Foreign Commerce, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 821 (1952).
4 W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2nd ed. 1973),
(hereinafter cited as Fugate).
5 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890). Also cited in Fugate.
6 Baker, supra note 2.
7 Id.
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While bribery has not been explicitly at issue up to now in cases
involving international trade, some private inducements to
foreign governments to engage in anticompetitive activity have
been the subject of litigation. There is no logical reason why
bribery of foreign officials may not be involved in future inter-
national activities which are the subject of antitrust litigation.8
Background - Foreign Commerce and U.S. Antitrust Laws
In order to understand the general background for the dis-
cussion of the application of the antitrust laws to foreign com-
merce, it must be remembered that the Sherman Act is the
primary U.S. antitrust law. The Sherman Act derives its author-
ity from the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Clause
3, section 8 of Article I provides that Congress shall have the
power "to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States . . . " It was under this authority that, in
1890, the Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal
• . .(emphasis added)
Section 2 makes it a crime to:
. . . monopolize, or attempt to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the states, or with foreign nations . . .9
Thus, the Sherman Act is applicable to basically two types of in-
ternational situations. The first is where imports into the United
States are unreasonably restrained (section 1) or monopolized
(section 2), thereby injuring U.S. consumers who must buy on a
less competitive basis. 1 The second is where export trade oppor-
tunities are restrained or monopolized, thereby denying other U.S.
businesses the opportunity to compete abroad on their merits."
By its very nature, foreign commerce may involve activity abroad,
8 Id. Also a recent case filed in the U. S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on January 16, 1976, U.S.A. v. Bechtel Corp., Civil Case
No. 6-76-99, deals with a form of bribery-blackmail. The case involves the Arab
boycott of Israel and the government's complaint alleges that the defendants
have conspired and entered into a combination which includes refusing to deal
with blacklisted persons. This has the effect, among others, of excluding black-
listed persons from supplying parts, systems and materials and suppressing
competition in an unreasonable restraint of interstate and foreign commerce in
violation of Section 1, of the Sherman Act.
9 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
10 Baker, supra note 2, at 55,439.
11 Id.
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as well as activity in this country. Foreign commerce can encom-
pass acts of American citizens in foreign countries as well as in the
United States, 12 and acts of aliens in this country as well as in
their own and other countries. The Act applies to these people
only if their activities have an anticompetitive effect on U.S. trade
or commerce - an effect which restrains U.S. imports, exports or
interstate commerce.' 3
A case which illustrates an antitrust violation with respect to
U.S. imports is the Justice Department's suit against the quinine
cartel, U.S. v. Nedarlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie.'4
The charges included counts under both sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. The indictment alleged that 15 corporations, 12
European and three domestic, had engaged in a conspiracy to
control and regulate the supply of cinchono bark, from which
quinine is produced, and of quinine and quinidine, drugs used for
many medical purposes including treatment for malaria and heart
disorders.
The alleged price-fixing was of two kinds. The first involved
a secret bid-rigging agreement between the European producers
of quinine whereby only a Dutch firm, Nedchem and its affili-
ates, would bid on the purchase of part of the U.S. Government's
quinine stockpile, but would share the purchase with the other
producers who would refrain from the bidding and thus be as-
sured of a low price. The second aspect was an alleged agreement
to fix the prices of quinine in the United States. The domestic
importers were joined as defendants in the suit.' 5
An example of a violation of the Sherman Act affecting U.S.
exports is Hazeltine Research Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp.'6  In that
case, Zenith Radio Corporation, which had been successfully en-
gaged in the business of manufacturing radio and television sets
for sale in the United States and foreign countries, had obtained
and used patents pursuant to licensing agreements with Hazeltine
12 Id.
13 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
See, Cook, The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts Committed by
Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA. L. REv. 303 (1934); and Hyde,
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 480 (Supp. 1935); also, International Antitrust Law Symposium Part 1, 8 J.
INT'L. L. & ECON. 1-112 (1973).
14 United States v. N. V. Nederlandsche, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75434 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
15 Id.
16 Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51, (N.D.
I11., 1965).
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Research, Inc. Hazeltine Research is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the Hazeltine Corporation, a diversified company that had
among its assets numerous foreign patents, including the foreign
counterparts of Hazeltine Research's domestic patents.
Prior to 1959, Zenith had obtained the right to use all of Hazel-
tine Research's domestic patents under a so-called standard pack-
age license. In that year, however, with the expiration of Zenith's
license imminent, Zenith declined to accept Hazeltine Research's
offer to renew, asserting that it no longer needed a license. Hazel-
tine Research brought a suit for patent infringement. Zenith's
answer alleged that the patent asserted was invalid, that Re-
search's claim was unenforceable because of the patent misuse,
and that Research had unclean hands because of its conspiracy
with foreign patent pools. Zenith later filed a counterclaim
against Hazeltine Research alleging violations of the Sherman
Act by the misuse of Hazeltine Research patents as well as by a
conspiracy among Hazeltine Research, Hazeltine Corporation,
and patent pools in Canada, England, and Australia. Zenith
contended that these three patent pools had refused to license
the patents (including Hazeltine Corporation patents) placed
within their exclusive licensing authority to Zenith and others
seeking to export American made radios and televisions into those
foreign markets.17
Hazeltine Corporation defended on the ground that:
• . . conspiracies by American companies with companies
abroad are governed solely by foreign law and are not violative
of the Sherman Act . . .18
The District Court brushed this defense aside, saying that it was
well established:
• . . that a conspiracy to restrain the domestic or foreign com-
merce of the United States to which any American company
is a party violates the Sherman Act irrespective of the fact that
the conduct complained of occurs in whole or in part in foreign
countries.9
The District Court found that Hazeltine Corporation had placed
its foreign patents corresponding to its U. S. patents in patent
pools in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, and had
thus conspired with Hazeltine Research to restrain the trade or
commerce of the United States in violation of section 1 of the
17 Id.
18 Id. at 78.
19 Id. at 78.
[Vol. 8: 496
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Sherman Act, and was liable for injury caused to Zenith's for-
eign business by the operation of the pools.20
The Supreme Court concurred as to the injury to Zenith's ex-
ports from the Canadian pool and held that it was illegal for
American firms to cooperate in a patent pool which had the in-
tended effect of limiting American exports of electronic products
to Canada by nonparticipants in the patent pool.21
Basically, this is the essence of U.S. antitrust enforcement
in international trade and, as such, is not particularly difficult to
grasp. However, when applied to problems like bribery of for-
eign officials, the international antitrust area is complicated by
important collateral considerations which must be taken into account
in determining whether or not subject matter jurisdiction may be
properly exercised. 22
Although Congress intended that the Sherman Act should have
a broad applicability to foreign commerce, the maintenance of
comity between nations under principles of international law place
certain practical constraints on the reach of this and other anti-
trust laws. If each nation were to apply its national laws to their
full extent regardless of the impact on the vital concerns of other
nations, severe international collisions and friction would be gen-
erated. Thus the application of our antitrust laws in the context
of international commerce may be balanced by considerations of
foreign policy and international law.
In his testimony, Mr. Baker discussed four constraints of par-
ticular importance which must be analyzed in nearly every inter-
national antitrust problem. These are:
(1) The doctrine of sovereign immunity;
(2) The doctrine of act of state;
(3) The doctrine of foreign governmental compulsion; and,
(4) Considerations of comity. 23
The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Briefly, the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that, un-
less he gives his consent, a sovereign (or his agents) is immune
from suit in foreign courts. 24  In the United States, however,
20 Supra note 16, at 77-78.
21 Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 132; 23 L. Ed. 2d
129; 89 S. ,Ct. 1562 (1969).
22 See Baker, supra note 2, at 55, 440.
23 Id.
2A L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238 (1816); The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddan, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See Note, The American Law of Sov-
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the doctrine is more restricted and excludes from immunity any
sovereign acts of a commercial nature.25
An example where the assertion of sovereign immunity has
been affirmed in an antitrust case was in the 1952 grand jury in-
vestigation of the petroleum industry.26 In that case, the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company moved to quash a subpoena directed to it on
the ground that it had been ordered by the British Government
not to produce documents not located in the United States and
not related to business transacted in the United States.27  The
Court found that the British Government, with a capital invest-
ment of about 35 percent and ownership of more than 50 percent
of the voting stock, controlled the company. Therefore, the com-
pany was considered to be an instrument of the British Govern-
ment and accordingly, the court quashed the subpoena. The basis
of the decision was that the company was a subdivision of the
British Government and was entitled to the immunity of a sover-
eign from a suit without its consent. 28 The Court distinguished
an earlier case, United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft,29
where the doctrine was not extended to a French corporation 3°
which was organized to administer potash mines in Alsace-Lor-
ereign Immunity Since the Tate Letter, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1964); Note, Sovereign
Immunity for Commercial Instrumentalities of Foreign Governments, 58 YALE L. J. 176
(1948). See, also W. Fugate, supra note 4, at 33, 34, 39.
25 Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
904, 906 (1824). The principle that immunity is limited only to the "governmental
acts of a foreign state" was enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in 1824:
. . . when a government becomes a partner in any trading company,
it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company,
of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen.
26 In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to Production,
Transportation, Refining, and Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952).
27 Id. at 289.
2s Id. at 291.
29 31 F2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
30 Eleven-fifteenths of the stock of the corporation, Societe Commerciale
des Potasses d'Alsace, was owned by the French government. The court, in
refusing to extend the doctrine of sovereign immunity, stated that a corpora-
tion is an entity distinct from its stockholders, that there were private share-
holders and that the corporation's by-laws provided that it could be sued. The
court also stated:
A foreign sovereign cannot authorize his agents to violate the law in
a foreign jurisdiction, or to perform any sovereign or governmental
functions within the domain of another sovereign, without his consent.
He, therefore, cannot claim as a matter of comity or otherwise that the
act of the alleged agent in such a case is the act of the sovereign, and
that a suit against the agent is in fact a suit against the sovereign. Id.
at 203.
[Vol. 8: 496
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raine. In that case, the French Government was involved in a
commercial venture by operating the company, whereas the oper-
ation of the Anglo-Iranian Company in supplying oil for the British
military was held to be a governmental function.31
The courts have generally deferred to State Department policy
in this area, and that Department has compiled a set of standards
for such cases. 32
Generally, in applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
the courts will follow a restrictive or strict construction and only
extenuating circumstances of a national security or political nature
will result in the recognition of immunity from the process of U. S.
courts with respect to sovereign diplomatic and political activities
even if these activities have anticompetitive consequences. 33
The Doctrine of Act of State
The act of state doctrine holds that U. S. courts may not re-
view the political acts of a sovereign within that sovereign's terri-
tory, even where the sovereign is not itself a party to litigation
and even where such acts would, but for the applicability of the
doctrine, be Sherman Act violations. 34  This doctrine was for-
malized in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.35 In that case,
the American Banana Company alleged that the United Fruit
Company, a New Jersey corporation engaged in the banana trade,
31 A distinguished commentator, Wilbur L. Fugate, noting that the two
corporations were both organized for commercial enterprises believes that the
two cases appear to be in conflict and that a commercial company engaged in
commerce in the United States should be subject to our laws, including the
antitrust laws. Fugate, supra note 4, at 113. See also, E. W. Kintner and K. D.
Hodlgartien, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign Trade and Com-
merce - I Variations on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
343-67 (1973); Earl Kintner and Katherine Drew Hallgarten, Act of State Doc-
trine, 3 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 133-40 (1973); Comment, International Law:
The Act of State Doctrine as a Limitation upon the Extraterritorial Application of the
United States Antitrust Laws, 21 J. PUBLIC L. 151 (1972).
32 Fugate, supra note 4, at 113. The DOS policy is as follows:
. . . The Department feels that the widespread and increasing prac-
tice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities
makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business
with them to have their rights determined in the courts. For these
reasons it will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity . . .
33 See Baker, supra note 2, at 55,440.
34 Id.
35 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. -347, 29 S. Ct. 511,
53 L. Ed. 826 (1909).
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had monopolized and restrained trade in violation of the Sherman
Act to the injury of the plaintiff.36
Speaking for the Supreme Court in the American Banana case,
Justice Holmes held that the complaint did not state a cause of
action under the Sherman Act since the acts alleged were con-
ducted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and
were legal under the laws of the jurisdiction within which they
were performed. Also, the Court said that it considered the acts in
question acts of a foreign government. 37
Many courts have distinguished the American Banana case on
the grounds that the Court did not see the acts abroad as sub-
stantially affecting U. S. commerce. 38  These courts view only
those acts and contracts abroad where U. S. foreign commerce
is involved or affected as falling within their jurisdiction. The
Second Circuit, in a 1956 case, characterized U. S. power over for-
eign commerce this way:
While Congress has no power to regulate commerce in the
Dominion of Canada, it does have power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations or among the several states. This power
is now generally interpreted to extend to all commerce, even
intrastate and entirely foreign commerce, which has a substan-
tial effect on commerce between the states or between the
United States and foreign countries . . . Particularly is this
true when a conspiracy is alleged with acts in furtherance of
36The complaint further alleged that after plaintiff, American Banana, had
purchased a banana plantation in Panama, which was then part of the United
States of Colombia, and had begun construction of a railroad to transport the
produce to export markets, it was notified by the defendant, United Fruit, that
American must either combine with United Fruit or stop construction. The
plaintiff complained that when it refused, the defendant influenced the Gov-
ernor of Panama to recommend that Costa Rica be allowed to administer the
land over which the railroad was to run and that later Costa Rican soldiers and
officials seized a part of the plantation and stopped construction of the railroad.
Then,' in an ex parte proceeding, a third party obtained judgment from a Costa
Rican court declaring the plantation to be his and he then sold it to the defen-
dant. Another charge was that United Fruit, to prevent competition, had se-
cured long term contracts with most of the producers of fruit in the region by
compelling them to meet its terms and thus injuring the plaintiff's export ca-
pacity.
31 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
38 See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1910);
United States v. Pacific and Artic Railway and Navigation Comp., Pacific
Coast Steamship Comp., Alaska Steamship Comp., and Canadian Pacific Rail-
way Comp., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1916); United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). Cf. Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Branch v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 141 F2d 31 (7th
Cir. 1944).
[Vol. 8: 496
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that conspiracy taking place in both the United States and for-
eign countries. 39
Another case which distinguished the Banana case was United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp.40 That case involved an alleged con-
spiracy to restrain trade and to monopolize the trade in sisal, a
Mexican plant used for making twine. 41 In distinguishing their
decision to fird jurisdiction, the Court said of the Banana case:
Here we have a contract, combination and conspiracy entered
into by parties within the United States and made effective by
acts done therein. The fundamental object was control of both
importation and sale of sisal and complete monopoly of both
internal and external trade and commerce therein.42
The Court went on to say that the basic object of the plan was the
monopolization of sisal in both internal and external trade and
that the violation occurred, at least in part, within the territory
of the United States.43
The Doctrine of Foreign Governmental Compulsion
The doctrine of foreign governmental compulsion states that a
private corporation should not be held liable for certain violations
of law which it may commit because it is compelled to do so under
risk of penalty by a foreign sovereign. 44 Thus, if a foreign govern-
ment compels a person to act in a specified manner which would
violate our antitrust laws, such compulsion is a complete defense
to an antitrust action based on the act compelled.
The application of this principle can be seen in a 1970 private
3' Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., Ltd., 234 F2d 633 cert. denied,
352 U.S. 871 (1956), 77 Sup. Ct. 96, Also cited in Fugate, supra note 4, at 42.
40 274 U.S. 268, 47 S.Ct. 592, 71 L.Ed. 1036 (1927).
41 The complaint alleged that the defendants, three U.S. banking corpora-
tions, two Delaware corporations, and a Mexican corporation, had conspired to
eliminate, and in fact did eliminate, the competition in the importation of sisal.
The Government complained that the defendants, by persuading the Govern-
ment of Mexico to pass discriminatory legislation, had enabled the Mexican
corporation to become the sole purchaser of sisal from the producers, and one of
the Delaware corporations to become the sole importer into the United States.
As a result, the Government claimed that there was no longer any competition
in the trade and that high prices were indiscriminately set. The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court which had dismissed for failure to state a cause of action
and held that the defendants had clearly engaged in a plan to destroy competi-
tion. Id. at 274.
42 274 U.S. at 276.
43 Id.
44 See Baker supra note 2, at 55,445.
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antitrust suit, Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,
Inc. 45 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that there had been a boy-
cott designed to deny it Venezuelan crude oil required for its oper-
ations. The plaintiff was a processor of low grade Venezuelan
crude oil, but was unable to obtain any for processing in its re-
finery in New Jersey because of the defendants' refusal to deal.
One of the defendants, Amoco, claimed it was unable to obtain
oil from its suppliers because the Venezuelan government had
forbidden any sales that would reach the plaintiff, directly or indi-
rectly. All suppliers refused to sell without the explicit permis-
sion of the Venezuelan government.
The District Court for the District of Delaware awarded a sum-
mary judgment to the defendants on the ground that they were
compelled by Venezuelan regulatory authorites to boycott Inter-
american, and thus had a complete defense to the matter. The
court stated that sovereignty includes the right to regulate com-
merce within the nations:
When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no
choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of
the sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction
on United States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns. By its
terms, it forbids only anticompetitive practices of persons and
corporations 6
When the plaintiff sought the court's inquiry and determination
as to the validity of the act of compulsion under Venezuelan law,
the court declared that it could not undertake such an inquiry
because the act of state doctrine commands that the conduct of
foreign policy resides exclusively in the sovereign. The court
went on to state that:
... anticompetitive practices compelled by foreign nations
are not restraints of commerce, as commerce is understood in
the Sherman Act, because refusal to comply would put an end
to commerce. 47
Issues of Comity
Issues of comity involve "situations in which two states have
concurrent jurisdiction and are likely to prescribe and enforce
rules of law requiring inconsistent conduct upon the same individ-
15 308 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
4 Id. at 1298.
47 Id. Fugate, supra note 4, at 80, notes that while the acts here complained of
were outside of Venezuela, that country nonetheless had complete control of
the oil which it exported.
[Vol. 8:496
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ual."48 Whether to exercise or to refrain from the exercise of
jurisdiction is a question that must be considered in good faith by
the courts of each state with a view to the principles of interna-
tional law. Some of these considerations are:
(1) The vital national interest of each of the states;
(2) The extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsis-
tent enforcement actions would impose upon the person;...
and,
(3) The extent to which enforcement by action of either state
can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule
prescribed by that state. 49
The generally accepted principle which was enunciated by
Mr. Justice Holmes in the American Banana case is that:
. . . the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be de-
termined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done.51
In that case, Justice Holmes was not examining the question
of the effects on U. S. trade but rather was viewing the validity
under foreign law of acts by a U. S. citizen in a foreign country.
He determined that the law of the foreign nation should govern.5 2
Today the prevailing view is that U. S. citizens in a foreign
country are not required to conform to U. S. laws, including the
Sherman Act, so long as their activities have no direct and sub-
stantial effect on U. S. trade. A vital notion in this area is the
international law territorial principle and its corollary, the "ob-
jective" territorial principle s3
The territorial principle as applicable in the United States
was first stated by Chief Justice Marshall in an 1812 case:
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is neces-
sarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible to no limitation,
not imposed by itself.54
48 Baker, supra note 2, at 55,445.
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
40 (1965), cited in Baker, supra note 2, at 55,445.
50 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
sI Id. at 356. See also Fugate, supra note 4, at 31.
52 See Fugate, supra note 4, at 31; See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9, comment f (1971), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 20 (1965). See also Note, Antitrust Law - A Foreign
Plaintiff has Standing to Bring Suit, under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Even Though
the Injury Occurs in a Foreign Jurisdiction, 10 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 579 (1975).
53 See Fugate, supra note 4, at 34-35.
54 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddan, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812),
quoted in Fugate, supra note 4, at 34.
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In its simplest form this means that a state, within its own territory,
has exclusive power and authority. But if taken literally this
principle means that all acts, including anticompetitive ones, must
have a particular situs within one country for any one nation to
have jurisdiction.5S This, however, does not account for a series
of related acts which may make up a crime where such acts occur
in two or more states. A contract may be made in one state and
performed in another. A conspiracy may be planned in one state
and carried out elsewhere.5 6 A bribe may be transacted in one
state and affect commerce in another. Thus the "objective" ter-
ritorial principle states that someone in one country, who willfully
initiates an action to take effect in another, is answerable at the
place where the wrong is committed.57 This principle was ap-
plied in a domestic antitrust case, Strassheim, Sheriff of Cook
County v. Dailys8 which involved the bribing of a public official
of Michigan and the obtaining of public money from Michigan
under false pretenses; acts which were carried out outside the
state of Michigan. Mr. Justice Holmes in that case stated:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punish-
ing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the ef-
fect, if this state should succeed in getting him within its
power.5 9
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws states:
If consequences of an act done in one state occur in another
state, each state in which any event in the series of act and
consequences occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction to
create rights or other interests as a result thereof.60
Comment a to that section adds that if two or more states have
concurrent jurisdiction, a state may impose liability upon any per-
son whose (illegal) activity produces consequences within that
state. 61  Comment e of a later section62 says that if any part of
a crime is committed in one state, the state can provide a penalty
55 See Fugate, supra note 4, at 34.
56 Id.
57 See Chief Justice Taft's discussion in Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593,
at 622, 47 S.Ct. 531, 71 L.E. 793 (1926). See also, Fugate, supra note 4, at 37.
58 221 U.S. 280 (1910).
59 Id. at 285. See also Fugate, supra note 4, at 37.
60 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1934). See Fugate, supra note 4,
at 37.
61 See Fugate, supra note 4, at 37.
62 Id. See, RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 428 comment e (1934).
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for the whole crime, not just the event within the state. The
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, section 18 (1965) states that a nation has jurisdiction63 to
prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
outside its territory that has an effect within its territory if:
(b)(i) The conduct and its effect constitute elements of activity
to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is
substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of
the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not incon-
sistent with the principals of justice generally recognized by
states that have reasonably developed legal systems. 64
Therefore, as stated by Mr. Baker, it would seem that "payments
to foreign governmental officials could be the subject of an anti-
trust suit where they were part of a scheme to restrain or monopo-
lize U. S. imports or exports if a suit was not otherwise constrained
by these four and other related considerations."65
Bribery and U. S. Antitrust Laws
Bribery has been an issue in a few domestic antitrust cases.66
The most notable case to date is Rangen Inc. v. Sterling Nelson &
Sons, Inc.67  In that case, a manufacturer of fish food, Sterling
Nelson and Sons, Incorporated, asserted that a competitor, Ran-
gen, Incorporated, had bribed an official of the State of Idaho to
prefer Rangen's products. Four claims were alleged in the
63 Fugate, supra note 4, at 38.
64 Id. See, RESTATEMENT SECOND OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
65 Baker, supra note 2, at 55,445.
66 More often, bribery questions come up under other Federal statutes in-
cluding:
(a) Section 162 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 162
(c) (1)(2), which deals with bribes paid to foreign officials and states
that no deduction shall be allowed under section (a) dealing with ordi-
nary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or busi-
ness for such bribes or payments;
(b) The federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), which
deals with bribes paid to domestic U.S. officials. See, Baker, supra
note 2, at 55,445; and A. L. Farnsworth, 32 T C M. 903 (1973) where the
I.R.S. failed to sustain its burden of proving that the taxpayer had un-
derstated earnings because of bribes to Mexican officials. In another
case, United States v. Rexach, et al., 482 F2d 10 (1st Cir. 1973), an
American contractor who, over a 25 year period, had given $10 mil-
lion in kickbacks to Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic,
it was conceded that the payments would be deductible if made be-
fore the date of the 1958 Amendment providing for section 162(c).
67 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965).
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
plaintiff's complaint. The first was based upon section 2(c) of
the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Pattman Act,68
which makes it unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, to pay or receive anything of
value as a commission (brokerage or other compensation) al-
lowance or discount except for services rendered in connection
with the sale or purchase of goods. The second and third claims
were based upon sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 69 The
fourth claim was based upon the Idaho Code7O which was the
State's counterpart to section 2(c) of the Clayton Act.71
At the trial, evidence was presented which showed that the
plaintiff and defendant were in competition with each other and
six other companies for the production and sale of fish food in
the western states. At various times during the 4 years prior to
1962, the plaintiff had contacted the Chief of Fisheries from Idaho's
Department of Fish and Game in an effort to sell its product to
the State. The State, however, did not purchase any fish food
from that company and, with only insignificant exceptions, the
defendant was the sole supplier of fish food to the State of Idaho
for consumption at fish hatcheries during those years.
For a period of 7 years, the defendant had paid a total of
$24,047.80 to a superintendent of the State's fish hatchery, who
was charged with the authority to inspect fish food for nutri-
tional value. The court found that these payments were made
pursuant to an understanding between the superintendent and the
defendant that the former would use his best efforts to obtain
for the defendant the fish food business for the State of Idaho.
After a trial, the District Court, sitting without a jury,
entered judgment for the plaintiff awarding treble damages and
attorney fees. The conclusions of law of the trial court indicate
that the damages were awarded on the first claim, involving
section 2(c) of the Clayton Act. An appeal was taken and the
Appellate Court felt the trial court had sufficient evidence to
find that the payments were indeed commercial bribes. As to
the question of whether the facts of the case pertained to section
2(c) of the Clayton Act,72 the defendants presented two lines of
68 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
69 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § I and 2 (1964).
70 Idaho Revised Code § 48-202(c) (1948).
71 As to that claim, the plaintiff invoked diversity jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C.
1332 (1964).
72 Section 2(c) reads:
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arguments. The first was that section 2(c) should not apply to
the case at bar because that section is directed solely against price
discrimination through rebates disguised as brokerage, not against
commercial bribery unassociated with price discrimination.
The court found nothing in the express language of the Act
nor in the statutory context of section 2 which required that
subsection (c) be limited to instances of price discrimination.
In fact in a previous case, Federal Trade Commission v. Henry Broch
& Co.,73 the Supreme Court noted with regard to the legislative
history that there was Congressional interest to proscribe other
practices other than just price discrimination including the bribing
of a seller's broker by the buyer.74
Second, the defendants relied upon a Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Boston & Massachusetts Railroad,7s as establishing
that ordinary bribery is not a basis for recovery under the antitrust
laws. That case was an action under section 10 of the Clayton
Act.7 6  The gist of the indictment was that railroad officers had
accepted bribes from the purchaser of some of the railroad's rail-
way cars as compensation for making a sale without competitive
bidding. The Court, in rejecting the government's contention
that the bribes and related agreements gave the officers a "sub-
stantial interest" in the purchasing company in violation of the
Act, said:
But it is doubtful that this indictment, as illuminated by the bill
of particulars, alleges anything more in substance than a bribe.
Bribery might well be in the family of offenses covered under a
conflict of interest statute. But it is more remote from an anti-
trust frame of reference 77
(c) Payment or acceptance of commission, brokerage or other
compensation.
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, any-
thing of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or
any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered
in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchan-
dise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent,
representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary
is acting in fact or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect
control of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom
such compensation is so granted or paid.
73 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
74 Id. note 55 at 169.
75 380 U.S. 157 (1965).
76 38 Stat. 734 (1914); 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1973).
77 380 U.S., at 162.
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The Rangen court, however, noted that the Supreme Court's
observation was not a definitive ruling and that there could be
circumstances where commercial bribery would be violative of the
antitrust laws.78
The court concluded that section 2(c) was not directed solely
against price discrimination through rebates described as broker-
age and, given fulfillment of the express requirements of sub-
section 2(c), held that that subsection also encompasses cases of
commercial bribery. 79
Donald L Baker's Hypothetical Situations
In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Inter-
national Economic Policy,8° Mr. Baker posed a series of hypo-
thetical situations. He divided these situations into five cate-
gories:
(1) Payment for favorable considerations in general;
(2) Payment for specific preferences in foreign government
procurement;
(3) Payment of foreign government "fees" or required "con-
tributions";
(4) Payment to control foreign sources of raw material;
and,
(5) Payment to procure foreign government action.
The first situation, which Baker believes to be the most
common form of bribery, he terms " 'grease the wheel' payments
for future considerations without the immediate prospect of ad-
vantage, offered in the hope that it will smooth future access to
or cooperation from government officials."81 In Baker's analysis,
78 351 F2d, at 857 (9th Cir. 1965). Where commercial bribery is associated
with evils which a particular provision of the antitrust laws are designed to
prevent, the fact that it was bribery rather than a mere defensive arrangement
ought to preclude application of the statute.
79 Id. at 858. The court also cited Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light and
Power Co., 136 F.2nd 12 (6th Cir. 1943), where the plaintiff power company
recovered damages under section 2(c) from its former president who had
accepted bribes in connection with the power company's purchases of coal.
The court there found that commercial bribery was within the intended pro-
scription of section 2(c) despite the fact that the compensation was not passed
on to the buyer. The court reviewed prior decisions which had construed sec-
tion 2(c) as an absolute prohibition of brokerage payments except for services
rendered and concluded that the threat to competition posed by such bribery,
brought within the terms of section 2(c).
s0 Baker, supra note 2, at 55,445-55,448.
81 Baker, supra note 2, at 55,445.
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this type of payment would most likely not be an antitrust viola-
tion in and of itself, for it is not usually made with the intent
to harm a U. S. competitor's export opportunities and as such
would not be directly related to the flow of imports into or ex-
ports from U. S. markets.82
The second situation, payments for specific preferences in
foreign government procurement, may very well effect U. S. com-
merce and thus could be seen as a violation of U. S. antitrust
laws. As an example of this type of payment, Baker gives the
following:
A U. S. firm, say, sells its product directly to a foreign
government for its own use, bribing the responsible foreign
procurement official to choose its product over that of a par-
ticular competitor. If the bribe is paid for the purpose of ex-
cluding the product of a non-U. S. competitor, there is no
likely violation of U. S. law since there is no anticompetitive
effect on U. S. foreign commerce.
If, to change the facts, a Delaware corporation is paying
a bribe specifically to ensure that a foreign procurement
officer buys its product to the exclusion of its principal com-
petitor, a New Jersey corporation, there would be an impact
on U. S. foreign commerce. It is not necessarily, however, a
violation of U. S. antitrust law. Whether or not there is a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act might well depend, for example, on
whether the procurement officer was acting in his official
capacity on behalf of his government in accepting the payment
or whether he was acting outside the scope of his authority. If
the former, actual execution of the purchase might well be an
act of state. The act of state doctrine thus might insulate the
Delaware corporation from antitrust liability since holding it
liable would imply a judgment about the conduct of the foreign
government officer, within his or her own territory, and this is
just what the act of state doctrine seeks to avoid83
The situation described above is similar to the one presented
in Occidental Petroleum Co. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.s4  In that
case, a private antitrust suit was brought by the Occidental Pe-
troleum Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Occidental
of Umm al Qaywayn against Clayco Petroleum Corporation
and Buttes Gas and Oil Company (Buttes). The complaint
charged that the defendants conspired to restrain trade, to monop-
olize, and to attempt to monopolize the exploration, development
and exploitation of petroleum reserves of the territorial waters of
82 Id., at 55,446.
13 Baker, supra note 2, at 55,446.
84 331 F. Supp. 92 (1971).
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the Trucial States. The plaintiff and defendant corporations
were holders of offshore oil concessions granted by two adjacent
sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf. The defendants were charged
in the complaint with instigating an international dispute over
the sovereign rights to a portion of the Gulf - allegedly covering
the richest area of the plaintiffs' concession - with the result that
the plaintiffs were prevented from enjoying the fruits of their
concession. The complaint alleged that the defendants, after
unsuccessfully submitting a plan to the British Political Agent in
the Trucial States whereby Buttes would drill for oil in a portion
of the Occidental - Umm al Qaywayn concession area, induced
and procured the Ruler of Sharjah (one of the sheikdoms) to
claim ownership of the oil-rich portion of plaintiffs' concession
area.
The defendants, in a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit,
relied on the limitation of antitrust jurisdiction articulated in East-
ern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.85 and
the rule of judicial abstention - the act of state doctrine. The
Court noted that in Noerr, the Supreme Court unanimously
decided that:
The Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from
associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or
the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that
would produce a restraint on a monopoly.8s
But the Court pointed out that the root of the Noerr decision was
a desire to avoid a construction of the antitrust laws that might
trespass upon the First Amendment right of petition 7 and that
the constitutional freedom "to petition the government" carried
limited if any applicability to the petitions of foreign govern-
ments."s The dispositive principle in the motion was the act of
state doctrine and the Court dismissed the suit and acknowledged
the Executive's primary competency in foreign affairs.89
To further complicate the analysis of the example above,
Baker suggests that if the procurement officer accepts the bribe,
without official sanction, the act of state doctrine would probably
not apply.90 He cites Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
- 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
16 331 F. Supp., at 107.
87 Id. at 108.
8 Id.
89 Id., at 108-109.
90 Baker, supra note 2, at 55,446.
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Carbon Co.91 in support of his suggestion. In that case, the Can-
adian government appointed a Canadian corporation to act as
that nation's exclusive agent to purchase and allocate to Canadian
industry vanadium metal during World War II. Without being
authorized to do so, the Canadian agent made purchases which
discriminated against the plaintiff and aided the Canadian agent's
U. S. parent in restraining and monopolizing the vanadium in-
dustry. Bribery per se was not involved in the case for the agent
was a loyal subordinate to the company seeking preferential treat-
ment. 92  The Supreme Court held the defendants liable for
violating the Sherman Act, declining to find that the agent's
conduct had been directed or ratified by the Canadian govern-
ment.93
Baker notes that at least three special facts were present in
the Continental Ore case which may not be present in instances
of bribery of foreign government procurement officers. 94 He
states that:
First, Continental Ore involved a conspiracy not only between one
private firm and a government officer but a conspiracy among
other private firms as well. It is not clear that the requirement
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act that the restraint of trade be
the result of a conspiracy will be met by a simple relationship
between a single private firm and a single bribed government
official, even one acting outside the scope of his or her author-
ity. 95
Baker also notes that in a domestic antitrust inducement case,
Harman v. Valley National Bank of Arizona%, the Court of Appeals
for the North Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of a
Sherman Act complaint. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendants, several leading Arizona banks, induced the then At-
torney General of the State of Arizona to file actions against
banks in the state which resulted in those banks being placed in
receivership with the intent to restrain and monopolize com-
mercial banking in the state. The court in its decision made
clear that more than one private company was involved in the
alleged bribe. 97
91 370 U.S. 690, at 707 (1962).
92 Baker, supra note 2, at 55,446.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 id.
%6 339 F.2nd 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
97 See Baker, supra note 2, at 55,446.
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Baker then continues his analysis of the two remaining special
facts:
A second, related factor is that in both Continental Ore and in
Harman the alleged antitrust violation was a much more ex-
tensive scheme of conduct than merely inducing specific dis-
criminatory behavior by a specific government official. There
would likely be judicial reluctance to use the antitrust laws to
deal with a simple bribery situation where the commercial
impact of that bribe was relatively limited. These two factors
would weigh against successful prosecution of a Section 1
action on the given facts.
Third, the defendants in Continental Ore had virtually total
control over the U. S. production of vanadium and over the
vanadium sold in the United States. This degree of market
power amply justified a finding that the defendants had
monopolized the relevant vanadium market, North America,
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It would be
most improbable that even an extended sequence of bribes and
sales to a foreign government would involve sufficient domina-
tion of any product market relevant to U. S. commerce. 98
The third hypothecal situation, payments of foreign govern-
ment "fees" or required "contributions," Baker feels may not be
a bribe at all. He states that these payments are more in the
nature of an "assessment" or "license fee" which firms are re-
quired to make to a foreign government as a condition of doing
business in that country.
The test of whether it is a "bribe" to the foreign official or a
"payment" to the foreign government can probably best be
developed under Section 162(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Where the payment is to the government, the principle of sov-
ereign immunity would, in most situations, preclude U. S.
antitrust enforcement against the foreign government. 99
Thus, these "bribes" or "fees" are just a cost of doing business
which must be absorbed by the U. S. corporation.
Baker's next hypothetical situation, payments to control foreign
sources of raw materials, can best be illustrated when a private
U. S. firm, conspiring to restrain trade in and monopolize a raw
material which is an important U. S. import, uses bribes to fur-
ther its anticompetitive purposes. 1°°  Both the American Banana
and Sisal cases illustrate this situation. The analysis of those two
cases shows that an attempt by a group of American firms to use
98 Id. at 55,446-447.
99 Id.
100 id.
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bribes of foreign officials to tie up the main foreign source of an
essential raw material used in the United States would in fact
be a cause of action under U. S. antitrust law. Due consideration
must be given, however, to the part a foreign sovereign is playing
in the activities. The whole transaction may be deemed to be an
act of state and exempt from the antitrust laws.
The last situation, payments to procure foreign government ac-
tion, Baker believes to be the hardest case to analyze.11 In this
situation, Baker assumes that a group of U. S. corporations con-
centrated their price-fixing activities abroad at the production
level. He further assumes that these corporations bribed the chief
executive of the foreign government to issue a presidential pro-
clamation ratifying all past private activities of the group or car-
tel and announcing that all future anticompetitive activities were
explicitly sanctioned and directed by the government. Assume
that this proclamation was valid under the foreign government's
local law and that failure to comply with the proclamation would
render those corporations liable to expropriation of assets if they
failed to continue their price-fixing control of exports to the United
States. 02 Baker, in analyzing this situation, states that:
This example brings into play the remaining two jurisdictional
considerations . . . namely, the doctrine of foreign govern-
mental compulsion and considerations of comity. It would ap-
pear the Cartel could not satisfy both local and United States
law. The respective laws are in direct conflict. At the risk of
disappointing you, I prefer to leave my question unanswered,
today. There are arguments to be made on both sides. Pres-
ent case law is relatively uncertain. I am sure we would look
very carefully at such a fact situation and not reject lightly the
option of bringing suit - especially where the vital interests of
U. S. consumers were involved.03
The requisite effect on U. S. commerce and the domination of a
product market required by sections 1 and 2 respectively of the
Sherman Act are clearly present. With respect to the govern-
mental compulsion, the analysis may hinge on whether it was "ac-
tual" or a more self-styled version and if the latter, a U. S. court
might not fird the doctrine of foreign governmental compulsion
applicable thus allowing a suit to proceed. With regard to issues
of comity, the analysis may finally focus on the impact on the U. S.
market and the vital interests of U. S. commerce.
10, Id. at 55,448.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 55,448.
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The problem presented by the above situation is a complex
and perplexing one which has not yet been heard by an American
court. Generally, where the doctrines of sovereign immunity,
act of state or foreign governmental compulsion are present, U. S.
courts will abstain from exercising jurisdiction. However, with
issues of comity, the courts are allowed a greater degree of dis-
cretion and will engage in balancing the various interests and
considerations present.
It is clear that the antitrust approach is based on fundamen-
tally different premises than the securities law approach. The
antitrust provisions arc aimed at a direct legal intervention into
the (illegal) transaction itself; the securities provisions are aimed
at the disclosure of the material facts. The assumption of securi-
ties law in this area of illegal payments is that disclosure of a
questionable transaction is enough to deter that transaction. Each
body of law has its strengths and weaknesses. Antitrust law is
direct but national in scope, examining situations which have an
effect on U.S. commerce or trade. Securities law is broader in
the sense that it applies to all U.S. corporations involved either
domestically or internationally. Further, it may be easier to cir-
cunvent securities law in that it is based on voluntary disclosures
by the corporation itself and has value only to the degree to which
those disclosures are examined and understood by investors. With
the above antitrust analysis in mind, an attempt will be made to
give an overview of the securities law approach to the problem of
illegal or questionable payments abroad.
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S APPROACH
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is taking a
different approach to the problem of payments by American firms
to foreign governmental officials.04 Rather than analyzing the
I'l In a speech at the Brookings Institution Seminar on International Trade
and Finance, Commissioner John Evans described the SEC's current position
on disclosure of improper payments. Evans said that generally the SEC al-
lcges that failure to reveal off-the-record funds, creation of false corporate
books and records, use of corporate funds for unlawful purposes, and use of
consultant fees or commissions to bribe foreign government officials violate
federal securities law. If illegality is uncovered, the SEC will seek relief
through court orders prohibiting continuation of such activities and agree-
ment that the company will appoint a committee of independent directors avid
attorneys to undertake an in-depth inquiry of past and present corporate con-
duct. The requirement of these in-house studies saves the SEC time and
mioncy.
Securities Regulation and Law Report, B.N.A. No. 346, 3/31/76, at A-15.
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payments in terms of their effect on U. S. trade and commerce,
their approach is directed to requiring firms to make a full and
fair disclosure of material matters which investors need to know in
order to make informed investment decisions. 11s The SEC was
created by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,16 to estab-
lish an agency for regulation of the securities markets of the coun-
try. Disclosure is and has been the central aim of the national
policy in the field of securities regulation. This emphasis is de-
rived from two basic considerations. The first relates to the
function of the Federal Government in investment matters; the
second relates to the belief that publicity tends to deter question-
able practices and to elevate standards of business conduct. In
other words, the government has assumed the responsibility to see
that investors and speculators have access to enough information
to enable them to make informed investment decisions.
The SEC's concern with illegal payments stems mainly from
the 1934 Act's requirement that corporations which issue securi-
ties must file or disclose certain "material" information. The
question of what is a material fact has been wrestled with repeat-
edly. The Supreme Court has stated that "material facts" are
those which "a reasonable investor might have considered . . .
important in the making of (an investment) decision."107 The
Second Circuit has recently added and expanded upon that defi-
nition:
Materiality focuses on the weightiness of the misstated or
omitted fact in a reasonable investor's decision to buy or sell.
• . .Account must be taken of all the surrounding circum-
stances to determine whether the fact under consideration is
of such significance that a reasonable investor would weigh it
in his decision whether or not to invest. 108
15 See Program of Federal Regulation of Securities, Federal Securities Lau's and
Corporate Mlanqeinent and Insurance Sheet, Panel discussion in Bus. LAW., Vol.
31, No. 3, at 1659-1687, 1703-1708. See also, Milton V. Freeman, The Let.ality of
the SEC's Manageinent Fraud 1)roqrain; Leonard S. Janofsky, Liability of AMaiiae-
rnent and Directors for Illegal Conduct; Protective Actions; and Warren F. Gricnen-
berger, Emerging Disclosure Requirements: Environmental and Socially Sitnificant
Matters, Bus. LAW., Vol. 31, Special Issue, March 1976, at 1295, 1313, and
1423 respectively.
' 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 a-jj (1970).
10 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, at 153-
154 (1972).
1I Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2nd 341,
at 362-363 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). The issue is again
before the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. which was
argued March 3, 1976.
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Material facts then are not limited to information solely about
a corporation's balance sheet. Even facts which have not yet oc-
curred may be deemed material after balancing the indicated
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magni-
tude of the event in light of the totality of the company's activity.
Thus, any information which can be seen as affecting the prob-
able future of the company and which may affect the desire of
investors to buy or sell or hold the securities of the company is a
material fact.109 Messrs. Sierck and Watson, in an articleo on
the role of the SEC in illegal and unethical business conduct, be-
lieve that unethical though legal corporate conduct might be
subject to disclosure as a "material" fact.'
The position of various SEC Commissioners appears to be
that illegal payments of corporate funds to obtain business are
"material" facts. SEC Commissioner Irving M. Pollock recent-
ly went so far as to state unequivocally that "the bribery of a
foreign official is a per se material fact." '  SEC Chairman Ray
Garrett, Jr., who has since resigned, stated in a January 16, 1975
address:
It may affect earnings if the president is sent to jail. It may
affect the quality of earnings if they are dependent to any sig-
nificant extent on illegal expenditures. If a company can
prosper at its present business only by successfully bribing the
local fire inspector, or what have you, that information is mate-
rial to even the most heartless and amoral investor.11
SEC Commissioner John Evans stated in an address on May 15,
1975, that knowledge of illegal payments is necessary if investors
109 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, at 849 (2nd Cir.,
1968).
110 Alexander W. Sierck and Keith S. Watson, Post-Watergate Business Con-
duct: What Role for the SEC, Bus. LAW., Vol. 31, No. 2, Jan. 1976, at 721.
111 Id. at 722. Thus, under the banner of materiality, the SEC is now ac-
tively investigating and prosecuting corporations for failing to disclose political
contributions and bribery payments both at home and abroad. The Com-
mission's complaint in SEC v. Sanitas Service Corp. typifies its approach. There
the SEC brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against
a corporation for failure to disclose that certain transactions were in fact "bribes"
paid to obtain business for the company. The SEC's complaint suggested two
reasons why it deemed this information to be material for investors: (1) In the
event that tax treatment of the bribes as deductible expenses were disallowed,
corporate earnings would be substantially reduced; and (2) the company's
use of bribery to obtain business was illegal and would be terminated if dis-
covered, thus also adversely affecting corporate earnings.
112 Bus. WEEK, Feb. 23, 1976, at 22, col. 2.
113 Sierck and Watson, supra note 110, at 723-24.
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are to make prudent judgments.114 Thus, the SEC has focused its
attack on illegal payments to foreign officials primarily in reliance
on the antifraud and reporting requirements of the 1934 Act.115
A recent illustration of the SEC's approach to the problem is in
its- handling of the General Tire and Rubber Company's proxy.
The Commission sought "voluntary" compliance from General
Tire in reporting any questionable payments either domestically
or abroad. General Tire disclosed some information but the
Commission charged that the material disclosed was not suffi-
ciently detailed and refused to approve General Tire's proxy,
114 Sierck and Watson, supra note 110, at 724. SEC Commissioner John
Evans stated in an address May 15, 1975:
(T)here seems little question that an investor might consider it important
to know that the management of his company is misusing corporate
funds to engage in conduct involving possible criminal activity. Such
conduct, even if the monetary amounts involved are not large, re-
flects on the integrity of management, particularly in connection with
proxy solicitations, and disclosure may well have a significant impact
on investor views regarding management's qualifications. Further-
more, the weighing of expected economic rewards against economic
risks is fundamental to any investment decision, and, while manage-
ment has claimed that they are engaged in secret payoffs and other
illegal activities in the shareholders' economic interest, such activities
increase the risks of doing business without informing shareholders of
such risks.
115 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to use or employ in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any (registered) security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device.
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act makes it illegal to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
Section 13(a) of the 1934 states that the Commission may prescribe any in-
formation as it deems necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of
investors and to insure fair dealing in the security.
Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful "to make any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact" in connection with tender
offers.
Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful to file documents or reports
with the SEC containing statements which are "false or misleading with respect
to any material fact."
Section 21 of the 1934 Act provides discretionary powers for the SEC to con-
duct "such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any
person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate" any provision of the
Act.
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thereby preventing the company from holding its annual meet-
ing. 116  The Commission subsequently filed a complaint 117 al-
leging violations of the antifraud, reporting and proxy provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.118 General Tire, in the above
case, has recently consented to the entry of a judgment of a per-
manent injunction in connection with illegal payments to foreign
officials.119  In addition to the entry of the permanent injunc-
tion, ancillary relief was ordered by the court. General Tire has
been ordered to maintain accurate books and records and accurate
supporting documentation for all transactions entered in its books
and records, and to provide the Commission with access to such
documentation in connection with these matters. General Tire
has also been enjoined first, from using or aiding and abetting
the use of corporate funds or funds of its affiliates or subsidiaries
for illegal foreign payments and second, from establishing, main-
taining or causing to be established any secret or unrecorded fund
of corporate monies or other assets or from making or causing
to be made any disbursement from such fund. In addition, the
company has been ordered to establish a Special Review Commit-
tee consisting of five members of the Board with special counsel
and to conduct an extensive investigation into the area of pay-
ments to foreign officials and to submit a report to the court and
to file the report with the SEC as an exhibit to the current
report on Form 8-K. 12
In another recent case, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp. ,121 the Commission alleged that Lockheed
violated the antifraud, proxy, and reporting requirements of the
1934 Act in connection with payments to officials of foreign
governments. 122
116 See On Foreign 'Bribes', VALUE LINE SELECTION AND OPINION, (N.Y.)
XXXI No. 30, Part II, April 30, 1976, at 823.
117 Securities & Exchange Commission v. General Tire and Rubber Co.,
(D.C. Dist. Ct.), filed 5/10/76, cited in Securities Regulations and Law Report,
B.N.A., No. 352, May 12, 1976, at A-9.
118 Allegations included the making of substantial improper and illegal
payments totaling several million dollars of corporate funds to officials and
employees of various governments. See supra note 117.
119 Supra note 117.
120 Id. at A-10.
121 Filed in the District Court for District of Columbia on 4/13/76, cited in
Securities Regulation and Law Reports, B.N.A., No. 349. 4/21/76 at A-3.
122 Id. The complaint alleged:
(1) That at least $750,000 was diverted to a secret corporate fund,
between 1968 to June 1975, and a portion of those funds was used for
payments to government officials;
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Without admitting or denying the allegations of the com-
plaint, Lockheed has entered into a consent decree similar to the
one ordered by the court in the General Tire case with the excep-
tion that Lockheed will have the opportunity, before filing the
report of the Special Committee as an exhibit to the current re-
port on Form 8-K, to apply to the court for a protective order
concerning the public release of and deletion from the exhibit
of those portions of the report that the Board deems to be harmful
to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders and not
"material under the federal securities law."123
Chairman Roderick M. Hills in an address'2 4 stated with
regard to corporate disclosures of illegal payments that:
When we pass the peak of the current filing season, by May,
(1976) we will probably conclude:
As many as one hundred corporations have made disclosures
concerning questionable foreign and domestic payments and
practices.
Substantially all of that number will have declared their in-
tention to stop past practices and will have adopted codes of
conduct to that end, or will have instructed their officials and
independent auditors to adopt practices that effectively
stop them. A few companies will disclose their intention to
continue some kinds of payments. Most will be small "facili-
tating" or "grease" payments designed to encourage public
officials to perform services that they should perform without
them. Others, a few, will see a compelling need to protect
their interest by continued bribes and some will chance it and
will neither reveal nor discontinue questionable past prac-
tices. If this is to be the state of affairs, is it enough? Will
we be able to say that the system works?
The answer, of course, depends on what you expect from
the system. 12s
(2) That since 1970, payments or commitments to pay at least $200
million to various consultants and agents and others were made without
adequate records and controls to ensure that the payments were made
for the purposes indicated;
(3) That at least $25 million of the $200 million was used for making
secret payments to government officials rather than for the stated pur-
poses. These payments were designed to assist the corporations in
obtaining and retaining contracts with foreign governments;
(4) That in one instance, a total of $100,000 in commissions paid by
Lockheed was kicked back by the consultant to Lockheed personnel for
their personal use, without the knowledge of the Chairman or Presi-
dent.
123 Id. at A-4.
124 Corporate Morality - Whose Business Is It?, address by Roderick M.
Hills, April 13, 1976, Los Angeles, Calif.
12s Id. at 6.
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In his final address26 before he resigned as Commissioner,
A. A. Sommer, Jr. raised questions about the SEC's role in the
foreign payment area:
All of us have been schooled in the notion that competition in
price and quality among sellers is the surest road to the most
efficient use of resources and maximum benefit to con-
sumers. When business is bought by payments to gain official
favor, this desirable competitive process is, somewhere in the
world, subverted. And while we in this nation may not be the
direct victims of this, nonetheless, such activity runs contrary
to our heritage, our ideologies, our modes of thinking, and we
therefore feel constrained to condemn it wherever it occurs and
no matter what justification may be asserted. I think all of us
would much prefer if all business, not just that done by Ameri-
can companies, were done in accordance with high ethics and
strict adherence to the law. Regretably, in some countries,
apparently, the abortion of the competitive process is not seen
as the evil that it is in this country and practices, repugnant to
us, but which are ancient in origin and woven into the very
structure of society, are accepted ways of doing business. This
cultural clash, this conflict of ideologies, is a part of a total
reality we cannot ignore and it is one that I would suggest we
have not yet begun to understand fully or deal with effectively.
I reiterate, lest sight is lost of this: Notwithstanding the mis-
givings I may express with regard to the manner in which this
entire matter has emerged, the way in which the Commission
has interpreted its mandate, the manner in which the Com-
mission has exercised its powers, nothing I say should be con-
strued as a condonation or approval of anything that has been
disclosed with regard to the questionable manner in which
some American corporations have done business abroad - or
at home for that matter. 127
Commissioner Sommer then continued in a manner which seems
to suggest he feels that the SEC should change its position with
respect to the disclosure requirements:
Conceptually, I think it is difficult to jibe these cases with the
traditional standards of materiality which have been applied
historically by the Commission. As I have mentioned, it was
only with respect to environmental matters that the Commission
adopted requirements in its forms requiring disclosure of suits
brought by governmental agencies notwithstanding the amounts
involved, and then only because of an apparent Congressional
mandate. Nothing in the Commission's historic interpretation
of its mandate has suggested that a corporation must disclose
121A Parting Look at Foreign Payments, address by A. A. Sommer, Jr.,
April 2, 1976, Columbus, Ohio.
127 Id. at 3-4.
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every charged violation of the law, every conviction that it suf-
fered under domestic and foreign law or every violation of law
or "proper" standards of conduct even if not the subject of a
proceeding. Why then make this exception with regard to il-
legal political payments?128
CONCLUSION
Many U.S. multinational corporations must feel that the risks
of possible liability under the antitrust laws and the disclosure
requirements of the securities law are worth taking when viewed
in light of the potential profits which illegal or questionable
payments foster. Also these corporations often feel that bribery
is a way of life in many foreign countries and a necessity if
they are to compete successfully with other firms who are engag-
ing in similar payments. The solution to the problem seems not
to lie with dramatic revisions of current law. In fact, any tam-
pering with the Sherman Act may lessen its flexibility and prove
harmful to its adaptibility to changing economic situations. The
Internal Revenue Service, in an attempt to discover which cor-
porations may have engaged in questionable payments and then
deducted them as business expenses, has recently sent to ap-
proximately 1,200 major corporations a set of 11 specific ques-
tions about possible illegal payments. 29  The IRS is hoping
128 id. at 11.
129 The text of the 11 question follows:
1. Did the corporation, any corporate officer or employee or any
third party acting on behalf of the corporation, make, directly or in-
directly, any bribes, kickbacks or other payments, regardless of form,
whether in money property, or services, to any employee, person, com-
pany or organization, or any representative of any person, company
or organization, to obtain favorable treatment in securing business or to
otherwise obtain special concessions, or to pay for favorable treatment
for business secured or for special concessions already obtained?
2. Did the corporation, any corporate officer or employee or any
third party acting on behalf of the corporation, make any bribes, kick-
backs or other payments regardless of form whether in money, property
or services, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of any govern-
ment official or employee, domestic or foreign, whether on the national
level or a lower level such as state, county or local (in the case of a
foreign government also including any level inferior to the national
level) and including regulatory agencies or governmentally con-
trolled business, corporations, companies or societies, for the purpose of
affecting his/her action of the government he/she represents to obtain
favorable treatment in securing business or to obtain special conces-
sions, or to pay for business secured or special concessions obtained in
the past?
3. Were corporate funds donated, loaned or made available, di-
rectly or indirectly, to or for the use or benefit of, or for the purpose
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for voluntary compliance but the questions appear to be so broad
as to raise the problem of whether or not a corporation could in
good faith supply all the specific data called for. There cur-
rently is no bottom figure for the amounts of payments for
which disclosure is sought. The resulting burden of searching
the records for payments no matter how small can be over-
whelming. The Securities and Exchange Commission, in an at-
tempt to shore up its provisions on disclosure, has proposed a
bill designed to amend relevent provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit certain issuers of securities from
of opposing, any government or subdivision thereof, political party,
candidate or committee, either domestic or foreign?
4. Was corporate property of any kind donated, loaned, or made
available, directly or indirectly, to or for the use or benefit of, or for the
purpose of opposing, any government or subdivision thereof, political
party, candidate or committee, either domestic or foreign?
5. Was any corporate officer or employee compensated, directly or
indirectly, by the corporation, for time spent or expenses incurred in
performing services for the benefit of, or for the purpose of opposing,
any government or subdivision thereof, political party, candidate or
committee, either domestic or foreign?
6. Did the corporation make any loans, donations or other dis-
bursements, directly or indirectly, to corporate officers or employees
or others for the purpose of making contributions, directly or indirectly,
for the purpose of opposing, any government or subdivision thereof,
political party, candidate or committee, either domestic or foreign?
7. Did the corporation make any loans, donations or other dis-
bursements, directly or indirectly, to corporate officers or employees or
others for the purpose of reimbursing such corporate officers, employees
or others for contributions made directly or indirectly, for the use or
benefit of, or for the purpose of opposing, any government or sub-
division thereof, political party, candidate or committee, either domestic
or foreign?
8. Does now or did any corporate officer or employee or any third
party acting on behalf of the domestic corporation have signatory or
other authority or control over disbursements from foreign bank ac-
counts?
9. Does now or did the corporation maintain a bank account or
any other account of any kind, either domestic or foreign, which ac-
count was not reflected or the corporate books, records, balance sheets
or financial statements?
10. Does now or did the corporation or any other person or entity
acting on behalf of the corporation maintain a domestic or foreign num-
bered account or an account in a name other than the name of the
corporation?
11. Which other present or former corporate officers, directors,
employees, or other persons acting on behalf of the corporation may
have knowledge concerning any of the above areas?
See Text of I.R.S. Questions to Companies, The N.Y. Times, April 8, 1976, at
58, col. 1.
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falsifying their records with regard to illegal and questionable
payments and related situations.130
"I The Commission proposes the following draft legislation for Congres-
sional consideration:
A BILL
To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
prohibit certain issuers of securities from falsifying
their books and records, and for related purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
That Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
78m(b), is amended by renumbering existing Section 13(b) as
"Section 13(b)(1)", and by adding at the end of new Section
13(b)(1), the following subparagraphs:
"(b)(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities regis-
tered pursuant to section 12 of this title and every issuer which is
required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title shall
"A) make and keep books, records and accounts, which
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions
of the assets of the issuer; and
"(B) devise and maintain an adequate system of internal
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable as-
surances that
"(i) transactions are executed in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization;
"(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (1) to
permit preparation of financial statements in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements and (2) to
maintain accountability for assets:
"(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance
with management's authorization; and
"(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is com-
pared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differ-
ences.
"(b)(3) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-
directly, to falsify, or cause to be falsified, any book, record, ac-
count or document, made or required to be made for any accounting
purpose, of any issuer which has a class of securities registered
pursuant to section 12 of this title or which is required to file re-
ports pursuant to Section 15(d) of this title.
"(b)(4) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-
directly,
"(A) to make, or cause to be made, a materially false or
misleading statement, or
"B) to omit to state, or cause another person to omit to
state, any material fact necessary in order to make statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading to an accountant in connection
with any examination or audit of an issuer which has a class
of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or
which is required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of
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Perhaps the most serious problem which has arisen out of
questionable payments is the possible legislative action which
foreign countries may deem necessary to enact. Many Third
World nations which host multinational corporations are ex-
periencing strong nationalistic trends and may view legislation
restricting investment as a logical solution to the problems which
have been created by multinationals. This response from host
nations, whether taken on a unilateral or multilateral approach,
would be particularly unfortunate. The number of U.S. cor-
porations disclosing questionable payments is relatively small
(about 100) when compared with the approximately 9,000 corpora-
tions which file information with the SEC. 131  Such an over-
reaction by host nations could result in laws which would chill, if
not freeze, the investment climate for a long period.
The United Nations has taken a first step in examining ques-
tionable payments and has established a new agency, the U.N.
Information and Research Center on Transnational Corporations,
whose primary function will be to draft a code of conduct for
multinational corporations. 132  U.S. corporations have been
concerned lest this United Nations sponsored approach result
in a two-tiered international code, U.S. corporations being held
to the higher standard. Corporations also anticipate that the code
would be directed solely at multinational corporate conduct to the
exclusion of national government conduct. Finally, corporations
fear that any broad code disclosure requirements could raise
significant problems of confidentiality. For example, if dis-
closure were made to a domestic agency, would that agency be
able to withstand a suit brought under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act seeking dissemination of that information? Would an
agency be able to obtain a protective order to prevent disclosure
of information requested in a subpeona? As the law is currently
interpreted, it appears that an agency would be forced to submit
to the requests for information. These are serious problems
which must be resolved before any code will receive the en-
thusiastic support of U.S. corporations.
Many developing countries view the MNC as a source of
this title, or in connection with any examination or audit of
an issuer with respect to an offering registered or to be regis-
tered under the Securities Act of 1933."
131 See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note
139, at 54.
132 See SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND LAW REPORTS, BNA., No. 339, January
28, 1976, at A-13.
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modern technology and as a means of attaining an advanced
economic posture rapidly. American businesses undoubtly feel
that these countries would view a code as a means of hastening
a redistribution of wealth from the developed to the developing
nations.
The multinational corporation has been cast in many lights -
from an extension of the national government into the economic
arena to a malevolent organization acting independently of local
law and eroding the moral character of the international com-
munity. A more sanguine and perhaps more accurate view is
that the MNC is the vehicle which is wiping away centuries of
conflict in the political, military, and geographical arena and
will, in the long run, advance world peace, lowering ethnocentric
barriers which have heretofore existed.
Finally, exposure of both those who offer illegal payments and
those who accept them to the international community and their
own countrymen may well bring these practices to an end.
RICHARD VERRI*
* J.D. candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1973-75.
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